oikoumene

anticipation

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT IN FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

No. 2 June 1970

CONTENTS

page

I Editorial Note - Technology in the Struggle for a More Humane Future: A Challenge to the Churches 1

II Conscience and the Scientist - L. Charles Birch 4

III The Future of Ideologies and the Ideologies of the Future - Luis Alberto Gomez de Souza 10

I

EDITORIAL NOTE

TECHNOLOGY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A MORE HUMANE FUTURE: A CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCHES

The mushrooming explosion of technology in our time is destined to make a profound and lasting impact on Christian social thought in the years immediately before us.

In the past few decades we have experienced a revolution in thinking about Christian responsibility in terms of economics and political structures. For centuries we had taken at face value the words "the poor are with you always" and we had interpreted the churches' economic role in terms of charity handouts to those worst hit by this inevitable, unchangable poverty. But then we began to take seriously the findings of the social sciences, especially economics and sociology. We discovered that the poor need not be with us always, that something could be done to change those structures which give rise to poverty, suffering and human exploitation. And if something could be done, we realized, then Christians should be engaged in trying to do it. Compare the thinking of the Stockholm Life and Work Conference of 1925 with that of the Geneva World Conference on Church and Society in 1966, and you see nothing less than a revolution in social ethics in the space of only four decades.

What has happened to Christian ethics as a result of the impact of the social sciences is now about to be repeated as we grapple in earnest with the new ethical issues arising from the natural sciences. The need to plan responsibly for the future use of technology has placed us on the brink of a second ethical revolution.

Why Now?

The Geneva Conference in 1966 had already identified the social application of technology as an area to which the churches needed to give sustained thought. The Fourth Assembly at Uppsala sharpened this concern and wrote it into the mandate of the Department on Church and Society. These are the roots of the new W.C.C. study project which is now getting under way.

There can be no doubt about the timeliness of this enquiry into "The Future of Man and Society in a World of Science-Based Technology". Among the several considerations which call for a specific contribution of the churches through the W.C.C., three deserve special note.

1. The time is now ripe for such a contribution. Among scientists, technologists, futurologists and planners in government and industry there is an astounding openness to people willing to think alongside them and look at their problems quite deliberately from a perspective of Christian faith. This openness is by no means restricted to those individuals who would normally call themselves "religious". For scientists and planners are well aware that, whether they like it or not, their work lands them in the midst of the most profound and agonizing ethical dilemmas of our time - dilemmas which they, as scientists or planners, are simply not equipped to resolve; dilemmas of which our society at large is but dimly aware. They are open to - indeed, many of them are yearning for - whatever insights our Christian tradition may have to contribute

to the building of tomorrow's world. But they are also well aware that at present our churches are not equipped to enter the debate. Far from being in a position to offer ready answers, we have barely begun listening to discern the real questions. The urgency of the issues, the openness of the experts and the unreadiness of the churches amounts to a clear call for action now.

2. Too much of the present discussion regarding technology and the future takes place within purely national or, at best, regional frames of reference. In highly industrialized countries one hears a great deal about ecology and the preservation of the environment, but what is happening to the rest of the world too easily falls right out of the picture. Much is said, for example, about population control. Residents of the prosperous countries are especially fond of the term, and by it is usually meant that "they" over "there" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America ought to do something drastic to curtail "their" population growth. Now, it is quite true that population growth has to be slowed if we are to survive on this earth for very much longer. The concern is entirely valid. But we need to see how this problem looks to our neighbours of the Third World. We need to hear them when they point out that a family of two in North America makes far heavier demands on the limited resources of "spaceship earth", and wreaks far more ecological havoc, than a family of ten in India. We need to hear their cynicism and anger when the wealthy countries' zealous talk about population control is not matched by an equally fervent commitment to world economic justice.

The World Council provides a valuable channel through which such provincialism can be challenged. It probes our prejudices with the insights of the neighbour who comes from a different generation, a different race, a different economic stratum, a different denomination, a different ideology. It helps us see ourselves, our world and our faith in larger perspective. Such a role, naturally, is controversial. But it is also creative and, in the long term, unifying. Such a world perspective has never been more important than it is now as we try to discern an appropriate Christian response to the challenges of technology and the future.

3. There is a dangerous tendency to climb aboard the technology bandwagon as a means of escaping from the ongoing battle for social justice, racial liberation and world economic development. "A great cop-out!" was how some black leaders responded to April's "Earth Day" activities in the United States. Others, working to terminate the military adventure of the U.S. and its allies in South East Asia, regarded the upsurge of environmental concern with equal suspicion as means of sidetracking the nation's concern from more immediate moral issues. The churches must resist all attempts to use technology as an escape hatch by which to avoid tackling such tough brutalizing realities of our time.

In fact, these two concerns - planning for the future use of technology on the one hand, and the struggle for social justice and human liberation on the other - these concerns belong together. For if we talk of justice without taking account of the changes technology is bringing to the world, then our action programmes are likely to be wildly unrealistic. Conversely, if we talk of technology without setting it squarely in the context of the struggle for human dignity, then our action programmes will be profoundly irresponsible. We in the churches must find ways of ensuring that, in our own thinking and that of the wider community, issues which belong together are kept together.

Programme Plans

At the end of June, over 100 people from around the world are assembling in Geneva for the W.C.C.'s first, exploratory conference on this new theme. Many will come from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Some will be young. The majority will be experts in the subjects under discussion: scientists, technologists, planners of different kinds, theologians and church leaders.

They will evaluate the methods and findings of scientists who are making predictions about the future of our world. They will grapple with the implications of the ecological crisis, of genetic and biomedical research, of population trends, of the impact of technology on inherited economic structures and political ideologies. They will be folded, spindled and mutilated as they play games with a computer. And throughout they will be asking about the meaning of responsibility, of hope, of love, of faith itself, in the kind of world we are building for tomorrow.

After a week together they will have helped us distinguish between the real issues and the false, the urgent problems and those which are peripheral, and they will have identified concretely a number of points at which the churches can most profitably play into the discussion. Or so we devoutly hope! Then will begin a systematic follow-up in various parts of the world, extending over the next four years, involving a large number of people with a wide variety of skills and using what will probably turn out to be a very diverse set of study strategies. Where this will lead us, at this stage - frankly - we cannot begin to imagine. But we do know that the subject's overwhelming size is matched only by its overwhelming urgency. This urgency is well stated in the prospectus of a recently established, secular institute for the study of the future:

> "The fatalistic view that (the future) is unforeseeable and inevitable is being abandoned. It is being recognized that there are a multitude of possible futures and that appropriate intervention can make a difference in their probabilities. This raises the exploration of the future, and the search for ways to influence its direction, to activities of great social responsibility.
>
> "This responsibility is not just an academic one, and to discharge it more than perfunctorily we must cease to be mere spectators in our own on-going history, and participate with determination in molding the future. It will take wisdom, courage, and sensitivity to human values to shape a better world. But the time is short, for events move ever more rapidly. Now is the time to commit ourselves fully to the problems of the future of our society."

Now, we might add, is the time for the churches to make that same commitment.

- - -

(The above statement was made to the U.S. Conference of W.C.C. member churches by David Gill, April 30, 1970. Mr. Gill is a member of the staff of the World Council of Churches' Department on Church and Society.)

II

CONSCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIST

by

L. Charles Birch

(Professor Birch heads the School of Biological Sciences of the University of Sydney. This paper was delivered as a radio talk for the Australian Broadcasting Commission.)

In 1663 Robert Hooke, the then secretary of the Royal Society of London, implored his fellow scientists to "improve knowledge of all natural things ... by experiments (not meddling with divinity, metaphysics, morality, politics, grammar, rhetoric or logick)". His advice was taken. For more than 200 years scientists turned their backs on society and fixed their eyes firmly on the laboratory bench. They were not forced to look up again until Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been obliterated. Some of them had, it is true, looked up briefly in the 1930's when Europe was rearming. A group of young Cambridge scientists clustered around the biochemist Frederick Gowland Hopkins. They wrote a letter to the editor of 'Nature' expressing their anxiety about the growing misuse of science. And that was all then. However, after the involvement of physicists in a war that led to the flattening of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a crisis of conscience of the physicists became widely shared on both sides of the Atlantic.

With the foresight characteristic of genius Albert Einstein said at the dawn of the nuclear age:

"The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking. Thus we are drifting towards a catastrophe beyond comparison. We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive." This "new manner of thinking" necessitates a revolution amongst scientists about their own attitudes.

I have two propositions to make that are both revolutionary and controversial:

Firstly, there is nothing that scientists should not investigate unless - and this is the important part - unless the declared objective is undesirable or possible consequences are undesirable. In the tradition of science up to the present we have tended to neglect that unless ... We have supposed that the adequate reason for pursuing any research was curiosity with no holds barred.

Secondly, scientific knowledge is not simply neutral information which scientists accumulate and which they can then safely leave to politicians and industrialists to decide what to do with. The responsibility of the scientist goes beyond his investigation to the effects his knowledge may have in the world.

Both propositions set a stage for confrontation between the scientist's work and his conscience. If we are to take that confrontation seriously, then we shall need to plan a new orientation to the training of scientists in which the spirit of enquiry will be guided by a sense of priority. As Robert S. Lynd concluded in "Knowledge for What?", "research without an actively selective point of view becomes the ditty bag of an idiot, filled with lots of pebbles, straws, feathers, and other random hoardings".

When Research threatens man's future

It is almost a heresy in science to suggest that any research could have undesirable consequences. The scientist tends to separate his research from the uses that society makes of it. But this sort of simple separation leads to a denial of responsibility for what the scientist does.

What sort of research could possibly be undesirable? This question leads to another one that has to do with the duties that fall upon a scientist when it becomes clear to him that further advance of knowledge in his line of research could involve serious danger to mankind.

There is a wide spectrum of possible investigations that we would need to examine with these questions in mind. At one end of the spectrum it will be relatively easy to say - this is an undesirable objective. At the other end we shall find it much more difficult to decide. When a biologist works in a biological warfare laboratory on research to develop a disease producing a virus more dangerous to man than any existing virus, then I would maintain that the result of that research is highly undesirable. The world would be better off without that particular bit of know-how. Nobel Prize winner in biology Professor George Wald of Harvard University, who is an authority on vision, was asked by a U.S. army laboratory a year ago to help with work on temporary blinding agents. "You know a lot about the chemistry of vision" they said, "you're just the man we want to consult with us". He refused. Instead he called upon American scientists to stop working on chemical and biological warfare which he called "the technology of death and destruction". About midway along the spectrum is this sort of problem. Suppose that someone wants to work on the production of a more virulent strain of disease-producing virus for the purpose of anticipating ways of combatting new virulent strains that may arise naturally in the future. Here the declared objective is desirable, but the risks to man may be great if such a virus escaped from the laboratory before man had time to become immune to it. Some years ago one world leader on virus research Sir Macfarlane Burnet who is also a Nobel prizeman made a decision not to do any work on viruses that did involve a threat to man. His view was that some existing research involved such a threat.

At the other end of the spectrum it may be exceedingly difficult to decide in advance whether the consequences of a particular piece of research are undesirable.

The dilemma of nuclear physics

Biologists are now facing, and may expect to face even more in the future, a moral dilemma about the declared objectives of their research and the possible deleterious consequences of some of their work. They are in the sort of dilemma the nuclear physicists found themselves in when they made the first attempt to fission uranium in the cellars beneath a grandstand of the football field in the University of Chicago. Their dilemma was twofold. The research was highly dangerous. It could have resulted in the laboratory being blown to pieces, together with its scientific workers and the rest of the University of Chicago. Professor Harold Urey had visions of toppling Chicago skyscrapers. Secondly, they knew that if they succeeded, then the first likely use of their discovery would be the making of the atom bomb. On both issues the decision was made by the scientists working on the project to go ahead. The moral issues

were deeply felt by these physicists in the Chicago lab and then later by many others when the project expanded to other sites. They found it quite impossible to detach themselves from the possible consequences of their work and they didn't. Science may be amoral but scientists never should be.

It is a disastrous mistake when people suppose that scientific knowledge is a neutral sort of stuff churned out by scientists who can safely leave it to the politicians and industrialists to decide what to do with it. The Chicago scientists of the 40's resisted this concept with all their might. Their decision to go ahead and make the bomb was one they judged to be desirable at the time. Some of them regretted this later. Albert Einstein said with deep concern after the war "If I had known that the Germans would not succeed in constructing the atom bomb, I would never have lifted a finger".

Robert Oppenheimer said the physicists had known sin. As scientists they felt inadequately equipped at the time to make the sorts of judgements they had to make about the consequences of atomic fission. But they did something about it. They held long discussions with those whom they thought might be better equipped, philosophers, theologians and politicians. I don't know how edified they were with these contacts. In an attempt to openly discuss problems of moral and political responsibility in the use of atomic energy, they produced a journal "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" which became the mouth piece of their disturbed conscience. They had crusades to Washington. They lobbied in the corridors of political power. A historian of these events at the time wrote "These men had rediscovered their personal consciences and were determined to overcome all opposition to guide society back to the road of progress and divest it from that which led to annihilation". Politicians called them the league of frightened men. Politically they had two great objectives - the civilian control of atomic energy in the U.S. and the international control of atomic energy in the world. They succeeded in the first but not in the second.

Probably the most effective of the non-official organizations of physicists that has contributed to peace is the Pugwash Movement, so called from the name of the small town in Canada where the first meeting was held in 1957. It was founded by Einstein and Bertrand Russell some years before in a manifesto about thermonuclear war which concluded: "We appeal, as human beings, to human beings; remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death." Pugwash conferences prepared the way for treaties on test ban, outer space and non-proliferation. They were effective because they included the scientists who knew the most and as Einstein remarked "these are the most gloomy". It is precisely because scientists know the most about possible consequences of their discoveries that they must be involved in decisions for mankind and cannot just hand over this responsibility to politicians and industrialists.

The newer dilemma of biology

Two years ago I had an hour's talk with Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the German nuclear physicist Hitler commissioned to investigate the possibility of making the atom bomb. When I visited him he was a professor of Philosophy at Hamburg University. Since then he has become director of an institute for the use of knowledge for the betterment of mankind. What I remember most from

my visit was his concern about biologists. "We must not" he said "let ourselves be overwhelmed by biology as was the case with physics." He then elaborated his concern that the new knowledge that biology was bringing to man could become as disastrous to mankind as atomic weapons would be in a nuclear holocaust.

The dilemma that many of us feel as biologists is not primarily the use of biology for biological warfare, horrible though that is. Most of us are not and never will be involved in that. I, with many of my colleagues, believe that to be a perversion of our science. It is not so much a dilemma as an evil to be fought against. Our chief dilemma is not that biology can be used deliberately to produce disastrous results. It is that disastrous consequences can follow from research which appears at the outset to be totally desirable in its aims. Probably the most significant contribution that biology has made to mankind is in the control of death through the conquest of disease. A consequence of this is the run away cancerous population growth in the world today with its attendant starvation and the frightening deterioration of our environment. Its single cause is death control.

The discoverer of DDT, Paul Müller, was awarded the Nobel Prize for the contribution DDT made in death control. DDT has saved countless lives from typhus and malaria. Early in 1969 DDT was completely banned in Sweden, the country that gave him the Nobel Prize. It was banned in Sweden because of its long-term deleterious effect on wildlife, particularly fish and birds. We know that DDT has saved countless lives, not only through ridding large areas of disease, but also because it rids many crops of their major pests. Yet, in the long run, it could be a disaster for mankind. It has certainly been a major factor in population growth which many of us consider to be a cancerous disease of our planet at this stage of its history. But there is a second large problem created by DDT. It is accumulating on this planet because it is not readily destroyed. It is accumulating not just in soil and the oceans but in living organisms, possibly in all living organisms and we just don't know what the long term effects of this will be.

DDT is remarkable non-toxic to man; about as toxic as aspirin. But take a big enough dose of aspirin and you can kill yourself. We are all dosed with DDT whether we are Eskimos in Alaska or city dwellers and we assume the levels of DDT in our bodies are quite non toxic. But who knows what the long term effects of this vast unplanned experiment will be? The answer is - no one. We just don't know what may be the effects of long term presence of DDT in the cells of our bodies. A paper published in the British Journal 'Nature' in 1968 claimed that relatively small doses of DDT fed to pigeons affected the functioning of enzymes in the liver and as well the level of sex hormones in the blood. Little is known of the effects of DDT on mammals. There have been claims that it induces cancer in mice. And in at least one DDT manufacturing plant the workers who were exposed to constant contact with large amounts of DDT developed a collection of very unpleasant symptoms.

Because it is slowly digested DDT is just about everywhere. It is one of half a million different pollutants that are cast into the oceans continually. In 1968 a short paper was published in the American Journal 'Science' which claimed that DDT slowed down photosynthesis in plant life in the sea. All life in the sea depends upon photosynthesis, the chemical process by which green plants bind the sun's energy and make it available to living things. I have an ecologist friend at Stanford University, California - Professor Paul Ehrlich.

He sees in this a sign of doomsday for the oceans. "Ecocatastrophe" he calls it. He has a conscience about these things and I suppose that is why he published a paper about it in the September issue of the political magazine Ramparts. The glossy cover is very striking; a tomb stone is set on the bottom of the ocean. Its inscription reads "The oceans. Born 3,500,000,000 B.C. Died 1979 A.D. The Lord Gave. And Man Hath Taken Away. Cursed by the Name of Man." It's a dramatic scenario. It is one biologist's way, exaggerated maybe, of putting his conscience to work and awakening ours.

They know not what they do

If we biologists, as a result of our efforts for death control, are providing the means of the destruction of our planet as a place where men can live, then it is high time we got together, as did the nuclear physicists, to get the facts straight, work out the consequences and let the public know what is happening. It took an atomic bomb to arouse the conscience of the physicists. It is the deterioration of our planet that is now arousing the conscience of biologists. Some are beginning to see the light, but for many the judgement over their heads will be "they know not what they do". I find it deeply disturbing at the present time, that the commonist view amongst scientists is that they have no special responsibility as scientists. In the short term this is a comfortable view to have, for to be responsible about these things we shall have to give up some of our time from our laboratories and do what the nuclear physicists did in Chicago in the 40's when they had the atom bomb on their hands. Professor Hans Bethe, one of the nuclear physicists who was involved in the atom bomb project, told us on a recent visit to Australia that ever since those days he has spent one third of his time on the social and political problems arising from nuclear energy. The socially responsible scientist of the future may well find himself spending up to one third of his time on social problems of his science because he has a conscience as a scientist.

You may well ask, can we then expect science and technology of the future to be solely dedicated to the great tasks of alleviating suffering and improving the quality of life on earth? The question has to be asked not of science and technology, which are impersonal, but of scientists and technologists. Is that asking too much of them? Ask anything less and you reduce scientists and technologists to the level of automatons, the puppets of politicians and industrialists.

There has been a revolution in science and technology. We now need a revolution of scientists and technologists. That will come when scientists are no longer seen as the amoral accumulators of information. They must become part of the wisdom of the renewed state. It will be their concern that the total 78 nation budget of the International Atomic Energy Agency "Atoms for Peace Project" is less than the U.S. expenditure on sending a single unmanned rocket to the moon, or that more is spent on one nuclear submarine than on the total research in agriculture in the U.S. It will be their concern that scientists in government services are so often prevented from expressing criticism of government policy. Unless the revolution occurs, then future historians join the human race at the hour of its greatest need but were prepared to be silent spectators of the world's agony.

The revolution has begun

The good news is that the revolution has begun. For three hundred years, the Royal Society of London, the oldest embodiment of scientific ethic, had an edict on its rule book prohibiting the Society as a body in pronouncing on matters politic. The rule was dropped in the late 1950's. As a result the president, Patrick Blackett, was able to tell the Queen in 1967 that the fellowship "can quickly and effectively voice a collective view on matters of urgent national interest". And if it needs any encouragement it is getting it from the newly formed "British Society for the Social Responsibility of Science". Across the Atlantic a group of American scientists have formed their "Council of a Livable World". That is exactly what it is, for it works to sway voters in political elections to vote for those candidates who will co-operate with scientists to make the world a more and not a less livable place. Then there is the so-called "Union of Concerned Scientists"in the U.S.A. which recently organized a one day symbolic strike at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University that accounts for the single biggest share of U.S. government defence research within its walls. Scientists and students downed research tools for one day to engage in intensive and searching discussions on the responsibility of scientists in the modern world. And now in Australia we have seen established this year groups for Social Responsibility in Science in each capital city. If there is one theme for these groups it is that the responsible scientist has not only a loyalty to truth but also to humanity, It is just no longer good enough to have as one's scientific credo - what it is possible for science to know science must know, what it is possible for technology to do technology must do. If it is possible to split the atom, the atom must be split - regardless. If it is possible to create a new and more virulent virus, the virus must be created - regardless. Science has its great virtues and these are its loyalty to truth and utter honesty. But the future cries aloud for scientists to add another loyalty to their credo and that is loyalty to humanity, to the values of man. About that we have a great deal to learn. If science is to be a blessing and not a curse on the earth, then the scientists of the future will have to be humanists first and scientists second, and that sort of scientist we had better start training right now before it is too late for humanity.

I have suggested that the watchdogs of science and technology must be the scientists and technologists themselves. But they must be the ordinary unofficial scientists and technologists. It is no good supposing that a new élite government department of science will do the job effectively. Nigel Calder in his book Technopolis expresses scant confidence in the possibility of scientists attached to government departments doing this job. These men are likely to be chosen because they are 'reliable' or 'establishment' and soon they become henchmen of ruling politicians. We need only to recall the assurances about the harmlessness of nuclear bomb tests of official scientists before the partial Test-Ban Treaty. The facts and arguments will have to be put forward by unofficial scientists and in such a way that more people will care to, and will be able to, master and assess them. In this view the key lies in a greater social awareness of the scientist and a community that is alive to the issues he will constantly be raising for its consideration. The conscience of the scientist may then become effective in appropriate political action. As the St. Louis group of the Scientist's Institute for Public Information in the U.S.A. remarked "we don't have to take vows of political chastity here". Such a view might make Robert Hooke turn in his grave. But it is a view that may, in the end, save humanity from an earlier grave into which Robert Hooke and his friends were inadvertently leading mankind.

III

THE FUTURE OF IDEOLOGIES AND THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE

by

LUIS ALBERTO GOMEZ DE SOUZA

(Prof. Gomez de Souza, a political scientist from Brazil, is working with CEPAL, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Santiago de Chile. His article was published in Víspera, No. 12, September 1969, Montevideo, a Roman Catholic bi-monthly publication.)

I. Introduction

Forecasting the future would be easier if we could eliminate the mass of uncertain facts and construct "surprise-free" projections. If we were to assume from the start that a technological age successively abandons its merely chance elements and becomes increasingly scientific and positive, uncertainty would tend to decrease. Now ideologies are certainly one of the most ambiguous and contradictory of those chance elements. Ideological tensions are many-sided, variable, in constant flux. How can a schema of the future be built on such a shifting basis? If ideologies could be eliminated, the task would be much easier. It is surely significant that Daniel Bell, president of the Commission for the Year 2000 in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and author of the introduction to the book by Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000, began in fact by analyzing the problem of ideologies in his well-known work The End of Ideologies. If the problem of ideologies were solved, it would be possible to determine a primary, basic trend, a "long-term manifold", just as Kahn and Wiener do: the trend towards an "increasingly sensate culture". If we were in a position to say, with Harvey Cox, that it is clear that technology rather than ideologies is going to be the motive-force of the revolutions of tomorrow (1), the margin of surprise would in effect be reduced to scientific innovations.

But is the situation really so simple? Can we leave ideologies out of account in a predictive analysis of the year 2000? And if ideologies are in fact to play any part at all, is it possible at present to predict which of them are going to be capable of doing so? What will their role be in building the world of the future?

Our analysis will, therefore, fall into three parts. First we must consider the actual future of ideologies. Then we examine the problem of particular ideologies in the year 2000. Finally we shall try to discover their function in the socio-political arena between the present day and that date.

We hope to show that while ideologies are conditioned by a situation, they also act upon it and modify it; they are its expression but, at the same time, give it the stamp of their own dynamism. The study of ideologies demands a grasp of the total social situation plus the discovery of what alternatives are available to it. For this kind of inquiry, therefore, a picture of the social structure on the basis of "other things being equal" has little meaning. It is the total social reality which explains ideologies, and that totality is itself changing under the action of ideologies.

---

(1) Harvey Cox, The Secular City (A Celebration of Its Liberties and an Invitation to Its Discipline). Macmillan Co., New York, 1965.

Furthermore, the questions we are going to raise will inevitably bring us into contact, though indirectly, with the epistemological problem which underlies forecasting and prediction, namely, can such prospection be considered a "science of the future" or is it simply an intellectual art of conjecture or a practical political skill? Analysis of tomorrow's ideologies presents a good opportunity for measuring the scope and limits of forecasting and prediction.

II. The Future of Ideologies

Crisis of ideologies

Ten years ago there was much discussion of the end, death or decline of ideologies. The world that had originated in the western countries, a world described by many as pragmatic, scientific and tending towards consensus, seemed to be growing out of ideological conflicts. As a sign of this, people pointed to increasing similarity between the programmes of the major political parties in the U.S.A., England, Western Germany, etc. One of the first publications to raise the question was Raymond Aron's book with the ironically suggestive title of L'opium des intellectuels (1955). The subtitle of the work of Daniel Bell already mentioned clearly places the debate in its chronological setting: "On the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties" (our italics). S.M. Lipset, Gabriel Almond and many others were to express similar ideas. If this trend continues, the study of ideologies about the year 2000 will be pointless, because in western countries they would have already begun to lose their meaning in the fifties. Some facts did create a psychological climate apparently favourable to this thesis at that time. There seemed to be some lessening of international tension after the Korean War (and after the apparent solution, at Geneva, of the problem of Vietnam), the destalinization process was beginning, colonial empires were coming to an end, Western Europe was prosperous and, above all, there was the enormous expansion of the North American economy. At the same time the development of the social sciences, particularly in regard to empirical analytical techniques, seemed to some to show that impressionistic studies were being replaced by objective analyses free from "subjective" and ideological connotations. We shall consider later whether the sixties have in fact confirmed the optimistic attitude prompted by these and similar facts.

Voices were soon raised in reasoned protest. The Swiss writer Jeanne Hirsch answered Raymond Aron the following year. Wright Mills dealt with the problem polemically: death of ideologies or ideology of death? (2) Jean Meynaud, in an extensive analysis of the theme, doubted whether a temporary decline of ideologies in the West means they are going to disappear entirely, and queries whether the actual thesis itself does not in fact imply a conservative ideology. (3)

It is significant that in the sixties controversy was replaced by conviction that ideologies are not only not declining, but are perhaps increasing in importance. The most diverse authors held this view. Carl

---

(2) "Letter to the New Left", quoted in Jean Meynaud, Destin des idéologies, Etudes de Science Politique, Lausanne, 1961, pp. 125, 202.

(3) Idem, pp. 17, 124, 127.

Friedrich, for example, speaks of an increase due to the influence of the developing world, and cites the example of nationalist movements (4). Joseph La Palombara rejects the idea of a possible decline, and points to the Italian example as a sign of ideological vigour. In his view, we are far from the end of ideology in Europe, although some interesting changes have occurred in ideological symbology. As regards the trend which some observers think has become apparent since the second World War, he makes a remark of interest for predictive analysis generally. He maintains that since generalizations made on the basis of such a short period are obviously imprecise, it is useless to pay serious attention to prognostics of what will happen in the next two centuries (5). Reinhard Bendix considers there is a change in the location of ideological conflict, rather than an end of ideologies. In his book on different types of opposition movements in the West, Robert Dahl concludes that the differences in basic political ideas and evaluations will probably increasingly affect any explanation of divergences in political behaviour and, therefore, in forms of opposition. At the same time, these crucial differences in political ideas and evaluations will very possibly be less and less susceptible of reduction to differences in economic or social characteristics. In this sense, political ideologies, far from disappearing, will probably have even greater influence (6).

It is interesting to consider the treatment of the same theme in Marxist thought. For some authors, Marxism and, historically, the coming to power of the proletariat, represent the end of ideologies. Henri Lefebvre, for example, declares that Marxism according to Marx is not an ideology, but marks and hastens its own end (7). According to him this does not prevent "official" Marxism turning into an ideology, so sharing in the decay of ideologies. Louis Soubise, commenting Lefebvre's thought, maintains that official Marxism, as an ideology and quasi-substitute for religion, has followed and still is following a law (if we may so call it), namely, that the end of ideologies is paralleled by their exacerbation, an exacerbation which expresses rather than conceals their decline (8). An intensification of the ideological conflict, far from marking their vigour would, on this account, announce their decay and death. Louis Althusser takes the contrary view and maintains that ideology as such forms an organic part of every social whole. Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and climate indispensable to their life. Historical materialism cannot conceive of a communist society without ideology (9). This analysis may be compared with Mao Tse-Tung's ideas on non-antagonistic contradictions in a classless society.

---

(4) Carl J. Friedrich, Man and his Government, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963, p. 91.

(5) Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology", in: American Political Science Review, New York, Vol. LX, No. 1, March 1966, pp. 9, 14. Cf. the reply by S.M. Lipset in the same number, pp. 17 - 18, and a final note by La Palombara, p. 110.

(6) Robert Dahl (Ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democraties, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967, Epilogue, v. 401.

(7) Henri Lefebvre, Sociologie de Marx, P.U.F., Paris, 1966, p. 73.

(8) Louis Soubise, Le marxisme après Marx, Aubier-Montaigne, Paris, 1967, pp. 59, 60.

(9) Louis Althusser, Pour Marx, Maspero, Paris, 1965; Spanish Translation, La revolución teórica de Marx, Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1967, p. 192.

This whole debate is taking place at a time when the optimism felt at the end of the previous decade is rapidly disappearing in the face of doubts and new difficulties. Technological development has brought the nuclear armaments race to such a pitch that the most inconceivable nightmares are possible. The war in Vietnam and its terrible intensification has put us back in the atmosphere of 1949-51. The Sino-Soviet ideological conflict and the economic difficulties, first of England and now of the United States, have once again altered an apparent trend towards stabilization. After the hopes of development in Latin America of the fifties, the crisis in the process of industrialization and the deterioration of the terms of trade have made the theme of dependence a complementary element in the study of development. Racial tensions and a rebirth of the "New Left" in the United States also indicate a recrudescence of ideological conflicts. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, in a study of the new radicals, query whether their apparent lack of ideology does not in fact conceal a rejection of positive ideology and a search for a new explicit ideology involving utopian thinking. The ideological rapprochement between the major political parties, as in the German case, did not mean an end of tensions; it showed the inability of those parties to translate and express the differences that had emerged in the movements among young people common to Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the United States. This suggests that instead of entering on a period of relative stability, as Kahn contends when he compares our time with the European age of the Holy Alliance of 1815, we may be nearer the barricades of 1848 (which had a deeper significance than Kahn attributes to them), or at all events to what the year 1815 meant for Latin America.

All this leads us to believe that the debate must not be determined by short-range facts; it is on the level of more general historical trends that significance must be sought. Before carrying our reflections further, however, we must pause to deal with a problem which sometimes renders the whole debate on the end of ideologies unintelligible. Different aspects of the same term get entangled. We have to ask what we mean by ideology.

Towards a clarification of the concept of ideology

It is notorious how many different meanings have been given to the term "ideology". For this reason, Philip E. Converse prefers simply to speak of a "system of beliefs", although he recognizes that this is not quite the same as an ideology. Nevertheless when he starts to apply his analysis, he introduces the categories of "ideological label", "ideologues", "near-ideologues", thus recognizing the specific character of the ideological.

Some definitions are so wide, according to Giovanni Sartori, as to be heuristically sterile and operationally ineffective. For Talcott Parsons, ideology is a system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity, and directed towards evaluative integration of that collectivity. According to C.J. Friedrich, that definition goes no further than that of a system of beliefs; something more specific is needed, connected with the change, reform or maintenance of the political order.

For Daniel Bell, a "total" ideology (he takes this conception from Mannheim) is an all-embracing system of total reality, a body of beliefs infused with passion and aiming at a total transformation of a whole way of

life; it is a secular religion. Ideology converts ideas into social levers. What gives ideology its force is its passion (10). The psychological element of "passion" replaces the idea that ideology reflects interests, in the tradition of Marx and Mannheim.

In these last two lines of thought we observe a search for a more restricted concept. Marx himself is rather vague on the matter. Lefebvre claims to find two quite different definitions of ideology in the work of Marx and Engels entitled The German Ideology. On the one hand ideology is said to be an inverted, mutilated, distorted reflection of reality; on the other, it is described as a theory which is unaware of its own presuppositions. This is partly due to the fact that Marx and Engels were studying specific ideologies and did not compose a treatise on the nature of ideology as such. Thus we find Engels analyzing the ideology of the bourgeoisie and what he calls higher ideologies of a higher order, such as philosophy and religion (11). Ideology is said to be closely linked with the problem of false consciousness; the true driving forces impelling a man's thought are unkown to the man himself. The term ceases to be unambiguous when the phrase "proletarian ideology" appears. George Lukács tries to see a need for "ideological maturity" in the actual process of overcoming ideologies. In this sense, the class-consciousness of the proletariat is the last in history, and its ideology is the end as well as the weapon of its struggle (12). One Brazilian essayist regards Marxism as having a dual character: it looks forward to a consciousness that transcends ideology and at the same time it is itself an ideology which reflects an alienated world (13).

Althusser makes an original attempt within Marxism to solve these difficulties. Thus he distinguishes between the theoretical "anti-humanism" of Marx (which is non-ideological) and ideologies. Socialist humanism is one of these, and is necessary on certain conditions. For him, ideology is a system of representations (imagery, myths, ideas of concepts as the case may be) with an existence and an historical role within a given society. This definition once more runs the risk of making the concept of ideology too general and ~~omits~~ fails to include the idea that ideology reflects the interests of the different social groups. Nevertheless it avoids attaching a general negative connotation to ideology because it is usually linked with the phenomenon of alienation. Althusser opposes Lefebvre categorically. For him, ideology is not an aberration or a contingent excrescence on history; it constitutes an essential structure in the historical life of societies. In a classless society, ideology is the soil and element in which men's relations with their conditions of life are lived, to the advantage of all men.

This digression was necessary to show how the concept of ideology is constantly being remodelled, even in intellectual currents where a certain consensus of opinion might be thought to prevail. Althusser's ideas will seem extremely unorthodox to many, but others are already making them a "new orthodoxy" (or "re-orthodoxy" as Edgar Morin calls it).

---

(10) Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology. On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, Collier, New York, 1961.

(11) F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, English trans., London 1934, New York 1935; cf. also Engels' letters to K. Schmidt (5 and 27 Oct. 1890, 1 July 1891); Marx-Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1966; Obras escogidas, II, Moscow, 1966, pp. 380, 398 and 499.

(12) G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Berlin, 1923; French trans., Histoire et conscience de classe, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1960, p. 95.

(13) Leandro Konder, Marxismo et alienaçao, Civilizaçâo Brasiliera, Rio, 1965, p. 153.

We owe the other important analysis of ideology to Karl Mannheim, who took up Marx's reflections and attempted to establish a "sociology of knowledge". What was once "the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research" (14). Mannheim distinguishes between ideology and utopia. Dominant groups can remain so intellectually imprisoned by their ideology in some situation which is to their interest, that they are no longer capable of seeing facts which might weaken their consciousness of domination. The concept of utopian thinking reflects the opposite discovery in the political struggle, above all the fact that certain oppressed groups have such a strong mental interest in the destruction and transformation of a given state of society that they unconsciously see in the situation only those elements which tend to contradict it. The problem of distortions due to "false consciousness" is carefully analyzed by Mannheim. We are not far, in this negative sense of ideology, from what Francis Bacon called "idols".

Drawing on the elements presented in the foregoing reflections, we propose for the purpose of the present article a definition of ideology which will serve as an operational concept in political analysis, without being too wide, thus weakening the force of the analysis, or inherently evaluative, thus destroying its own usefulness as a means of evaluation. Instead of using the term "passion", which is too subjective, restricted and psychological in import, we prefer the more objective notion of dynamic ideas, ideas which are a driving force. This points to the power ideas possess of inspiring loyalties and prompting action. The orientation towards action seems to us indispensable if ideologies are to be distinguished from systems of beliefs generally. In line with the classic analyses, we note that ideologies are closely linked with social needs, but we shall try to avoid the negative connotation some authors give them.

We therefore define ideology as a set of dynamic expressing the interests of social groups, with the purpose of preserving or changing the social structure (15).

---

(14) Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge and Kegan, London, 1954, p. 69.

(15) See Arnani M. Fiori, Elementos sobre personalismo y compromiso, Centro de Documentación MIEC-JECI, Montevideo, 1968, p. 17 (mimeographed text without author's corrections). Also Henrique de Lima Vez, Servicio de Documentación MIEC-JECI, Series 2, Doc. 2, 1966, p. 7: "rationalization of the interests of a social group, or the rational justification of the practical goals sought by the group". Similarly in: Julio de Santa Ana, Servicio de Documentación, Series 2, Doc. 4, 1967, p. 6: "Ideologies are schematic conceptions of reality conditioned by the economic, social and cultural situation of the groups which support it, and they serve those groups in planning their action to preserve or attain their interests."

Content. A constellation of dynamic ideas, interrelated, but not necessarily in a systematic, rigorous or explicit way. We must be free to discover what Robert Dahl calls "diffused ideologies", implicit and latent as it were, in various forms of behaviour, prejudices and value-judgments. Robert Lane draws an important distinction between the overt ideologies of the conscious ideologist and the latent ideologies of the man in the street.

Origin. Ideology springs from social interests, not from detached intellectual speculation about reality. It corresponds to social needs, of which it is the expression on the plane of ideas.

Subject. There is no such thing as the ideology of a single author (at most it would be a theoretical effort); ideologies are bound up with social groups. We do not specify further here, because to do so would restrict their universality. (This sets a problem for Marxists, too, when they come to analyze ideologies in a classless society, as Althusser, for instance, does.)

Purpose. To conserve or change society. Ideologies have a political end, and this includes both ideology and utopia as Mannheim conceives them.

Before going further, it may be as well with the help of this definition to clear up certain obscurities. Ideology is distinct from theories, doctrines, or world-views (Weltanschauung), although it may tend in their direction or make similar claims. We use the term "theory" in the sense David Easton gives it. A political theory is a set of causal and normative statements (theory on the highest level, "broad gauge" or systematic theories). A theory of this kind, excogitated by one or more authors, aims at being as comprehensive as possible within a particular discipline. Ideologies do not operate on the same level of complexity, and are intended to be more practical, extracting from reality those elements which are useful for action. Confusion is due to the fact that ideologies tend to look like total explanations and also use the conceptual framework of political theories, which precede them or to which they give rise. At the same time they look to theories for their logical justification and for the instruments by which they analyze reality. In practice, it is not always easy to draw the distinction, but it is extremely important and useful to do so if we are to study movements of ideas in a sociological and political perspective. The liberal ideology is not imprisoned in the thought of Locke or Rousseau, nor the democratic ideology of the United States in Jefferson and the Federalists. The problem would seem more difficult as regards Marx's political theory and Marxism as an ideological movement. Marxist thought has never wished to be separated from the "praxis" of the working-class movement. In fact, however, the internal problems of Marxism, which we referred to above, and the different Marxist currents, are establishing a distinction between the original thought of Marx himself, the individual ideas of Marxists and Marxist sympathizers, and the Marxist movement as embodied in the history of the four Internationals. We have already noted Althusser's distinction between Marxism as a "theory" (which he considers a more rigorous term than "philosophy") and a socialist ideology. From another point of view, we could say that the distinction is not so much between Marxist theory and Marxism as stated above, as between Marxist political theory or theories and socialist ideology, which is wider in extent than the Marxist currents. Socialism as an historical and ideological movement is both vaguer and wider than the Marxist conceptual framework, although until now the latter

alone has provided it with rigorous instruments of analysis (16).

The distinction between ideology and doctrine is similar, but we prefer to use this latter term as little as possible. It seems to be covered by our wide definition of theory (and in other cases it has an ethical connotation which distinguishes it clearly from ideology). Similarly ideology must be distinguished from religion, even though, historically speaking, an "ideologization" of religions is observable. It has also to be noted how Christianity has endeavoured to avoid being mistaken for an ideology, and has sought in the perspective of faith a way of overcoming the tendency towards ideologies which religion displays. What is termed the "social doctrine" of the Catholic Church involves a latent ambiguity. It presents certain features of a political theory (when it seeks to describe or explain the social structure in not over-rigorous terms, or lays down, for example, the principle of subsidiarity). But it also has features of a social ethics (and this is what gives it its specific character among the pastoral duties of the Magisterium). And it has ideological features when it is compared with other forces (liberalism, Marxism, etc.). Confusion is complete when it is considered as it is embodied in actual political parties, such as the Christian Democrats. An effort of theological analysis will have to be made, and the political action of Christians recast and remodelled, if these confusions are to be overcome.

Another distinction that has to be clarified is that between ideologies and political parties. Various Marxist parties vie with one another for ideological authenticity. So do parties that claim to be Christian in inspiration. Parties which formerly were opposed are at no pains to hide their present similarities (cf. the convergence between liberals and conservatives in Chile or Colombia). The two big Brazilian parties of the 1945-65 period (PSD and UDN) have the same tacit ideology and only differ in emphasis. In the same country there is even greater identity within the new bipartite regime (ARENA and MDB). There is often a tendency, when speaking of the future of ideologies, to think of the future of particular political parties, whereas the problems involved are deeper and extend beyond the domain of political institutions. Parties come and go. If particular ideologies also have their rise and fall, longer periods are involved.

This brings us to an essential characteristic of ideologies, their <u>historicity</u>. Ideologies not only have a history, they are intrinsically historical in character. Their origin is determined by time and place. Since they express group needs, they depend on the emergence of these groups and their needs. The formation of ideologies is not an arbitrary act but is conditioned by the historical process, as we noted in our introductory section.

Again, the problem of historicity does not merely concern each ideology in particular; it concerns the phenomenon of ideologies as such. This brings us back to the question of the end of ideologies.

---

(16) The same line can be seen in the distinction drawn in John XXIII's Encyclical <u>Pacem in Terris</u>, between philosophical theories and "historical movements that have economic, social, cultural or political ends, not even when these movements have originated from those teachings and have drawn and still draw inspiration therefrom. Because the teachings, once they are drawn up and defined, remain always the same, while the movements, working on historical situations in constant evolution, cannot but be influenced by these latter and cannot avoid, therefore, being subject to changes, even of a profound nature." Vatican Polyglot Press translation, C.T.S., London, 1963, p. 58.

The end of ideologies?

Reinhard Bendix declares that if it is possible to discuss the end of ideologies it should be possible to discover when they began. And the answer is, he thinks, that the term has no application in western civilization before the 17th and 18th centuries. Before then, he holds, the explanation of reality had been based on belief in God, and, after a period of transition, which began at the Renaissance, nature took the place of God, and so introduced ideology as the mental perspective. Frederick U. Watkins speaks of an age of ideology extending from 1750 to the present day. Daniel Bell narrows it down even more, and in the introduction to the work already referred to, defines ideologies as a particular complex of ideas and passions which emerged in the 19th century. If we were to restrict the use of the term ideology to this small section of human history in time (three or four centuries at the most) and in space (the West), it would be quite reasonable to think of its end and, with Bendix, to speak of a possible post-ideological epoch. Furthermore, everything seems to show that we are already entering on a new period of transition, so this may very well mean that the year 2000 will fall after the "ideological age". Our use of the concept of ideology is intended to have greater universality. This sort of divergence shows the ambiguities that beset the debate on the end of ideologies, and how indispensable it is for everyone to define his use of terms. The end of the "ideological age" (in the sense which limits it to one cultural horizon) will represent, then, the end of some particular ideologies, and, as we shall see later, the end of some determinate ideological expression, but not necessarily the end of that ensemble of dynamic ideas, open to action, which is what we understand by ideology.

To return to the theme of historicity, the different ideologies are conceived within the global pattern of a cultural epoch, even when they reject it. The pattern is defined by the meanings and values of the world at a particular time. Henrique de Lima Vaz calls this "historical consciousness". A new level is reached when people begin to seek another world picture. According to this author, the "historical consciousness" of modern times emerged when the "natural cosmos" of the men of Antiquity disintegrated under the impact of the scientific and technical revolution inaugurated by Galileo's creation of physico-mathematical science. The "ideological age" is situated within the horizon of the "historical consciousness" of that epoch. But what will occur when we pass to another epoch with a different pattern of meaning and values?

The gestation of the modern epoch coincided with the age of the great inventions, in particular with the invention of printing, so important for the circulation of ideas. "Today, the invention of information-systems linked with computers, fundamentally affects the means for conveying concepts, the totality of elements of decision and the deployment of intellectual forces, and facilitates the radical criticism of traditional industrial society" (17). And the journalist whom we are quoting speaks of a second and true "Renaissance". History will achieve what Emmanuel Mounier proposed more than thirty years ago, as an intellectual and practical goal: "refaire la Renaissance".

---

(17) J.J. Servan-Schreiber, "El segundo renacimiento", Ercilla, Santiago, 5 June 1968, p. 33. On the basis of these and other valid assumptions, however, the same author, in a best-seller, draws some highly disputable conclusions, by using carefully selected data in support of his thesis (Le défi américain, Denoël, Paris, 1967).

In these days of cybernetics, the problem recently has been not merely one of content (types of dynamic ideas) but of their internal correlation and coherent linguistic expression - as a language. Here we encounter the crisis of ideology on a profounder level of significance, which makes it proportionately difficult to make a predictive analysis of a coming period, when we do not know whether this crisis will have been overcome or not. The rapid success achieved by Structuralism may be due to the fact that it is right in the centre of this set of problems. The same is true of contemporary studies in linguistics in the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. If, with Adam Schaff, we consider that "language is a social product, genetically and functionally linked with the totality of the practical activities of man in society" (18), the profound technical changes which are living through must transform the actual mode of social communication. And since ideology is communication in view of action, its power of expression is affected. This difficulty, which has already been analyzed in regard to religions, for example, also arises for ideologies. This explains, to some extent, a certain vagueness in present-day "utopias", the apparent rejection of ideology which we have noted in the American "New Left" and the unorthodoxy of student revolt throughout the world. To use Lane's expression, in this transitional epoch, emergent ideologies are in a latent state, not merely because they are seeking their course but also because they have to recast their syntax.

After the scientific and industrial revolution of capitalism in the last century and the technological revolution which we are passing through at present, and whose limits it is difficult to discern, isn't the time of the "cultural revolution" approaching, in which ideologies will have a definite role to play? Is this what their function is going to be towards the year 2000?

We have said that the end of the so-called "ideological age" indicates the disappearance of certain ideological patterns, but not the end of ideologies. Someone might say that the future advent of full rationality would mean that actions will be based on the precise findings of technology and not on vague ideologies. But how can we be sure that history will become perfectly transparent, rational and immune from doubts? To suppose that it could, would surely mean the destruction of historicity as such and its capacity for fulfilment? In the case of future times which involve ambiguities, will technology constitute a sufficient force of action? Paradoxical as this may seem, the very imprecision of ideologies would make them a greater help in facing uncertainties. This does not prevent the most implacable criticism of any distortions that ideologies may contain. But all the foregoing reflections lead us to think that ideologies will continue to have an important function to perform in the future. This is why we are asking what their role is going to be in the next decade or two. Before that, however, we must inquire what will characterize them towards the year 2000.

---

(18) Adam Schaff, "Lenguaje y realidad", Diógenes, Buenos Aires, No. 51, July-September 1965, p. 147. Cf. Henri Lefebvre, Langage et société; Spanish trans., Lenguaje y sociedad, Proteo, Buenos Aires, 1967, pp. 125-128.

III. The Ideologies of the Future

How to classify and analyze ideologies

In her "Geography of Ideologies", Jeanne Hersch lists the following: fascist, communist, conservative-liberal, democratic-progressive and socialist. The Center for International Affairs of Harvard, in an analysis of the role of political ideologies in international affairs, names as the three with the most adherents, constitutional democracy, nationalism and communism. Every author thus has his own classification, often quite an arbitrary one, confusing ideologies with political theories and existing political parties. At the same time they fail to examine latent and emergent ideologies, and also miss the ideological changes taking place inside ideologies themselves. When we remember their constant flux and development, it is obvious that to mark their boundaries too narrowly and to withdraw them from the actual process of history, will mean the loss of much valuable information.

Paul E. Sigmund points out that the most recent discussions of ideology have emphasized function rather than content. Contents are often diffuse and sometimes ambiguous (Nazism, for instance, saw itself as a kind of socialism). The sociology of knowledge might well look into this problem. From the point of view of general sociological analysis, it is more important to discover what factors condition ideologies (the needs which they meet), and, from the point of view of political science- and of speculation regarding the future - in what direction they orientate action. It is curious to see how this brings us back to the dual road opened up by Mannheim: ideology and utopia.

Starting from a given social structure as a whole, we can attempt to divide ideologies into those that aim at preserving the system and those that seek to change it. This distinction obviously does not solve all problems. Some ideologies seek to change the system from within (by gradual reform), others by proposing an alternative system (by revolutionary break). Yet some of the former might well be regarded as conservative ideologies, since their modernizing efforts would seem to be an attempt to keep the system in being. Besides, do all ideologies that claim to offer some alternative system really do so?

Gradually, as the historical process incorporates new elements into the structure, ideologies are organized to justify or oppose them, in the same of a more distant prospect. This dynamic function is the centre of interest for a political analysis. What function will the various ideologies have in the year 2000 in maintaining or rejecting the social situation?

In any analysis of ideologies, of course, we encounter their explicit contents (the most obvious of their dynamic ideas). But the aim will be to discover their implicit content and the goal of their thrust. This means inquiring into intentions, not on the plane of individual psychology, but of social needs.

The methods of political science, of social psychology, of sociology and anthropology, can lend mutual support. There are intensive analyses such as those carried out by Robert Lane, or extensive ones, such as the public opinion surveys made by Philip E. Converse. In other cases a specific ideological current is investigated. The technique of content-analysis can be very useful. All these isolated efforts would become meaningful within a global study such as Marx undertook. Of course we are not so ingenuous as to think that the

various enterprises mentioned are cumulative in character and can be combined, for of course they belong to distinct and contradictory theoretical frames of reference. We are merely recalling the wide range of possible analyses and at the same time their fragmentary character when they concentrate on one method in isolation.

How can we deal with the problem of the ideologies of the future when we do not know what its structure or what its social groups will be? How is a study of what may eventualize to be serious, and not mere speculation, of no importance whatever?

Ways of determining the universal ideology of the year 2000

Dynamic ideas take shape, historically speaking, in relation to the elements of the social structure which they either reinforce or oppose in the name of some wished-for world of the future. Conversely, these visions of the future are rejected both by those who defend the existing situation and by partisans of other alternative futures. These disagreements give rise to the ideological struggle which in periods of transition can be very sharp and confused. The situation becomes even more ambiguous when the description of future worlds becomes a "scientific" way of projecting the present into the future. We shall return to this point later.

The conviction that ideologies are not going to disappear does not imply the view that the ideological conflict will be equally intense. What many take to be a decline may merely have been a momentary lessening of tensions. Moreover the increase may occur in different sectors of the social structure. That is why we have raised the question whether the future may not witness a debate on the cultural plane with consequences that are still impossible to foresee.

Thus the ideological constellation is going to depend on the historico-social structure which conditions the ideological struggle. If we do not take this into account, our analyses will be arbitrary. The best way to investigate the ideologies of the year 2000 is to seek the themes and framework of possible controversies at that date. The controversies themselves will spring from the main problems which society will then have to face. Obviously, therefore, we must take as provisional parameters - not forgetting how precarious predictive analysis and forecasting is! - the central trends of the society of today, projected a little beyond the date in question, together with their alternative hypotheses. There are two groups of trends we can take, those that are world-wide and those that belong specifically to the situation in Latin America. It is well-known that ideologies always aspire to universality, but the conditions proper to each region inevitably impose a very individual stamp.

The great world trends in the next half century are being quite intensively studied. I shall, however, give only a general, not an exhaustive list. Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener present thirteen long-term trends, ten of which may be useful to us with some slight modifications.

Technological and scientific development, the third industrial revolution as it has been called, is opening up unsuspected possibilities of mastery over nature. Kahn and Wiener list a hundred possible technical innovations

between now and the end of the century, yet these, the same authors forecast, will be superseded by further surprises. A great deal has been written on electronics and computers and their importance in research (e.g. simulation) and in decision-making. But the sometimes naïve enthusiasm has to be balanced by the problems that technology creates. Ideologies can range from "La petite peur du XXe siècle" referred to by Mounier in the title of one of his books, to the most passionate technocracy. The relation between man and machine will very likely continue to provoke controversies.

Such development will take place on a universal scale, either as a reality already achieved or as a claim and expectation. The so-called "Third World" is in question here. Will it be integrated or not into the post-industrial age, as many call it? If not, are there any short-term trends favourable to integration? It is interesting to note that the work of Kahn and Wiener, ambitious in its perspectives as it is, has a description of post-industrial society in the U.S.A. (Chapter IV) which maintains a rigid position in regard to international stratification. By making simple projections on the basis of the very disputable per-capita GNP indicator, they forecast an increase in the economic gap between nations. It is quite obvious that the ideological conflict is going to depend closely on world stratification. We shall return to this point, with special reference to Latin America.

The growth of population and urbanization are two other widely studied subjects. An urban world creates problems such as that of privacy; it will modify the ways in which individuals interact, enter into social relationships and form social groups. The internal organization of ideological movements will be affected. Will anarchism not have something to say in face of an industrial urban world? What place will there be for what Henri Desroche calls "ucoopies" (cooperative or communal utopias)? (19)

As regards education, many of the predictive studies are timid and remain on the quantitative level. Not merely the content of instruction, but methods of learning as well, are going to change radically as a result of the technological advance. But, to return to what we said above in regard to language, there will possibly be a more important revolution on the actual plane of meanings, in the meeting of "les mots et les choses". (20) The very pulse of ideologies, as well as their external expression, will be affected. What outbursts of "irrationalism" may not accompany this movement?

As man's dominion over nature increases, there will be more free time available, more leisure. Will this create more favourable conditions for the "cultural revolution" of which we spoke above?

We could go on listing trends (in telecommunications, health, space-exploration, etc.) and their possible impact on ideologies. In one sector

---

(19) Henri Desroche, "Voyages en ucoopies", Esprit, Paris, quoted in op.cit. note 5 above, pp. 222, 245.

(20) It is impossible to predict what time in the future will be sufficiently distant for it to be feasible to attempt an "archaeology of the human sciences" such as Michel Foucault undertook for an earlier epoch in Les mots et les choses, Gallimard, Paris, 1966.

it is particularly difficult to present trends in separation from ideologies: that of political analysis. The interrelation there is too close, as we shall see, for us not to have to be content with simplifications.

But the future ideological panorama in Latin America would be quite incomplete if conditions that specifically belong to the region were overlooked.

For Latin America, the problems that will continue to give rise to dynamic ideas range from the struggle for physical survival to the problems which a one-world civilization is already creating. To remain at the elementary stage of this range would impose narrow limits that would hide the new means by which all these problems, including that of meeting the most basic needs, can be solved. Yet to attempt to deal with world-wide themes straight away, without facing the basic fact of domination, could be simply one way of ignoring the most urgent problems, out of Olympian indifference and a kind concern for the future which is of doubtful value, thus maintaining the present system. It is from within its own set of problems that Latin America must take its place as an independent agent in the world-wide movements.

The future of ideologies in Latin America in the year 2000 is going to depend on how (among others) four great challenges have been met: development, dependence, integration and consciousness of Latin American identity.

The theme of development has been present since the fifties, largely owing to the work of CEPAL. Industrialization in countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina produced a certain optimism. Economic development led to the study of other aspects in an attempt to achieve a comprehensive concept of development. Will ideology and development projects exist at all in the future? What alternatives are there?

In the sixties, the crises of industrialization in two of the countries mentioned, and the worsening of Latin America's terms of trade among other facts, focussed attention on another factor which conditions development, namely, its external setting. In the last few years, various studies have been carried out from different points of view, on dependence. Although dependence and imperialism are not identical, the connections between the two are in fact so close that they belong to the same ideological controversy. Can there be a Latin America that is neither a satellite nor peripheral? Will it have to accept a role of "client" under the protection of a "paramount power"? Will this problem have been solved by the year 2000? Will the project of an independent Latin America still be a "utopia" or will it have been merged in the prevailing "ideology"?

This brings us to the theme of integration. The idea has been current since the days of the attainment of independence. But the discussion of the various senses of integration is increasingly vigorous at the present time: "decentralization" or strategy of development as an alternative to revolution or its fulfilment, etc. There are profound divergences as to how action in regard to dependence is to be combined with endeavours to promote development and integration (21). Nevertheless, under the polemics one definite trend is emerging - towards Latin American unity.

---

(21) Cf. Documentos del VI Congreso Interamericano de Planificación, SIAP, Hacia una política de integración para el desarrollo de América Latina, Ed. América, Cali, 1967. For a comparison of two ideological approaches to the same theme, see Douglas Bravo, "La revolución venezolana y la revolución latinoamericana" in: Punto Final, Santiago, No. 33, second fortnight in July 1963, Supplement, pp. 4-9; Adolf A. Berle, Latin American Diplomacy and Reality, Harper and Row, New York, 1962, pS.

Independence, development and integration - of whom exactly? Is Latin America an entity with its own specific character? On the cultural plane there is an increasing growth of awareness and conscious search for identity. The "cultural revolution" to which we have referred will have this problem as one of its topics for debate. Will the twenty-first century be pre- or post-revolutionary in this sense?

It is within these trends that we can understand the various projects of socialism, national development, neo-capitalism, etc. and their revolutionary or modernizing strategies and their tactics of violence, search for consensus, etc.

But these trends and projects depend on how deeper structural problems are faced, in what Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Falletto call "a nucleus of deep significance for the possibilities of development". This would include "the social control of production and consumption" and the "democratization of the structure of political power".

The most serious work that can be done, therefore, is to present, in the form of questions, the possible directions and courses the future may take. In this perspective, inquiry would have to be made for what Pierre Massé postulates as "facts pregnant with the future", for these, by opposing powerful trends, can turn the historical process onto a favourable course. Dynamic ideas can then penetrate such facts and lend them their own driving-force. But here we are already observing how ideologies are not merely based on facts but also act on them. This brings us to the last part of the present study.

IV. Ideologies share in making the future

The trends which we have been examining are inseparable from ideologies and can only be fully explained if we make plain the interaction between the two. It is not a question of returning to the discussion prompted by Max Weber's account of the "spirit of capitalism". But just as Weber sought the psychological conditions which made possible the development of capitalist civilization, we too can ask whether the development of technology was not, is not, and will not be made possible by the presence of certain impelling ideas of particularly dynamic power.

If that is so, the same thing could be said with much greater grounds in regard to cultural and political trends. These condition and are conditioned by current ideologies. If ideologies are rooted in social needs, their confrontation with these needs will beget further ideologies. The historical trends of the next few years, as we have seen, will limit the formation of the ideologies of the year 2000. But those ideologies in their turn will provide the driving-force of the following century. Hence the heuristic value of the predictive study of ideologies. And for the sake of completeness, at the risk of excessive repetition, we must also say that the ideologies of today are preparing the trends of tomorrow, which in turn are the source of the ideologies of the day after tomorrow. Nevertheless, there is not merely a temporal succession between them, but a structural relation as well.

The social situation of Latin America in the year 2000 will in some sense be the outcome of, among other factors, the ideological conflict which is developing today and will continue in the next few decades. It is in this perspective that we can say that the ideologies of today are creating the Latin America of the year 2000. They can contribute to development or slow it down. Regional satellization, the establishment of centres of socialism, the success or failure of integration, are to a certain extent open possibilities which are linked to the political decisions which are being taken now. Realization of these political alternatives depends on the precision of their strategies, and the latter depend on the realism of their actions. And ideologies are present and operative in the choice of policies, strategies and tactics.

Here we pause for an epistemological and a methodological digression, which are closely linked. Both the thesis of the death of ideologies in the future, and the kind of analysis of the future which considers itself to be neutral and omits the study of ideologies in social reality or as implied in the analysis itself, surreptitiously introduce and are prompted by a typically ideological attitude. Jean Meynaud, referring to France, claimed that a large part of the speculations about the future are nothing more or less than attempts at persuasion in the service of the existing social order.

An example on the methodological plane will assist. The use of combined data, with statistics drawn from the past and projected into the future, on the assumption that the situation will follow the same rhythm, is of considerable utility, provided its exact scope is recognized. The authors of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators are very precise in this respect, when they insist that such a procedure is simply a forecast, not a prediction; it says what could happen if the figures remain unchanged, it does not predict that they will remain unchanged. Consequently it is essentially a vague approximate estimate of future conditions, a method of "persistence forecast". By its very nature, as they point out, this method cannot identify any change in trends; consequently its value decreases the longer the range of the attempted projection.

The authors of The Year 2000 are not as rigorous as this. Their methodological explanations move simultaneously on the planes of projection and prediction. The first step is to choose "long-term trends that seem likely to continue". On the basis of the known variables and our current expectations, we then create a "surprise-free" projection, and describe a "standard world" corresponding to it. For this projection "significant statistical base lines" are constructed whenever possible, but the result is more complex than the "naïve projection of the economist because it also includes the implications of whatever empirical and theoretical considerations affect our expectations". In the Handbook, projections are distinguished from prediction, as possibly serving a useful purpose in the preliminary search for possible indications of lines to follow, before the predictions and decisions are made. In Kahn and Wiener's book, however, the projections are part of the prediction, and instead of clearly bearing an exploratory function, they seem to be there to give the prediction a scientific air. It is true that the authors declare that their "standard world" reflects their "expectations" and that they try to make this as explicit as possible. But this does not alter the fact that in the "surprise-free economic projections", using only the fragile per-capita GNP indicator and only a single method, whose limits we have already noted, they very emphatically arrive at conclusions like that of the "standard

world", which in fact represents the result of the coincidence of a methodological presupposition inherent in the projection, and an expectation regarding the future in the prediction. The content is the same ("There will be no change"), but its meaning is different in each case. How can we fail to conclude that we are in the presence of an "ideology" in Mannheim's sense, and as we saw at the start?

This digression was necessary in order to draw attention to a dichotomy which will be increasingly present and which claims to distinguish two kinds of strategies, one based on ideological prejudices and the other built on a scientific foundation. Ideological roots are present in all the various strategies, while empirical methods of investigation can be used in many of them, provided that their limitations are realized, as well as their ineluctable intrinsic requirements and consequences.

It is important to realize that we do not set ideology aside when thinking of a world of the future, and that we cannot avoid adopting some position. Moreover, the act of will involved is essentially a political act. Political analyses are carried out in relation to this act. What use there be, especially in Latin America, in studying trends without sketching possible alternative policies for the future? These political alternatives become meaningful within an ideological project. Jean Lacroix distinguishes between anticipation and project, Gaston Berger between projection and prospection. Someone has remarked that the important thing is not to divine what will probably happen but to prepare a desirable future, and also perhaps to go further and try to make it probable that what is desirable will happen.

What is a desirable future but a future which makes possible the liberation and full development of man? In the case of our region, it is a matter of seeing that the Latin American can live in the year 2000, not as a peripheral human being but as a person responsible for his own history.

For all that, as Maurice Blondel wrote in 1893 (and, as Berger notes, he was a precursor of "prospection"), it is a matter of a project to be carried out if we wish, not of a problem to be solved if we can. Some solution is inevitable, consequently it is more urgent to prepare it than to make it foreseeable. In regard to this necessary goal, foresight is optional, but preparation is obligatory.

- - -